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Abstract 
A loose financial policy through the provision of loans and fiscal subsidies to state-
owned enterprises and households has long been practiced in China, though financial 
liberalization since the 1980s has revitalized banks and other institutions. By using 
provincial data, this paper attempts to show the relationship between liquidity and 
productivity in post-reform China. China’s total factor productivity growth is estimated 
by the Malmquist index. A total of four regression models have been employed and the 
findings support the inverse relationship between liquidity and productivity, especially 
since 2008. China’s loose financial policy that promoted “cash-richness” must be 
reexamined as excessive liquidity coexisted with decline in total factor productivity. An 
increase of 1% in liquidity would result in about 0.6% loss in total factor productivity 
due to market distortion. 
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 Despite the “Nixon-Kissinger Initiative” in 1972 that lured China to the side of the 
USA in the Cold War had opened a new chapter in China’s economic development, 
China’s market reform in 1978 has resulted in four decades of rapid economic growth. 
The large influx of foreign direct investment had enabled China to achieve the world’s 
largest international reserve and largest global trade surplus. However, given its 
difference in political ideology, China’s economic growth and expansion would come 
with its ideological influence. Through its “cheque book diplomacy”, China has 
engaged in an expansionary policy in the international arena. Since 2014-2015, for 
example, the “one belt, one road” project aimed to initiate infrastructure development 
westward to the Euro-Asia region and other developing countries have ended up with 
many huge “debt traps” experienced by the recipient countries (Li, 2017a; Roland, 
2017). However, China’s decades of rapid growth have also exposed to numerous 
domestic inadequacies and problems. One problem relates to the deployment of the 
financial resources through provision of bank loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and government subsidies to enterprises and households. The question is whether large 
provision of financial liquidity could promote the real economy.  
There are several existing theoretical frameworks that studied the economic 
performance of financial resources. In the theory of the firm, the principal-agency 
theory studied the intrinsic interest between the shareholders and management of the 
corporation (Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1994). In financial 
markets, raising capital through private channels would allow firms to accumulate 
capital for expansion (Tobin, 1965, 1980). In developing countries, the study on shallow 
finance or financial repression pioneered by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued 
that the productivity of financial capital is crucial in growth and development, and it is 
only through a process of financial deepening that could direct financial capital to 
productive ends. Studies by Li and Leung (1994) and Li (1997) have considered the 
monetization process and financial liberalization in China’s reform. Another line of 
theoretical development deals with the argument in “soft budget constraint” in socialist 
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countries where provision of state subsidies to enterprises and households have resulted 
in massive fiscal deficits (Kornai, 1982).  
The theoretical discussion in this paper relates to two strands of literature. The first 
concerns the possibility of excess liquidity leading to resource misallocation, while the 
second concentrates on the impact of resource misallocation and the possible loss in 
total factor productivity (TFP). The literature on excess liquidity and credit 
misallocation covered discussions related to banks, financial market, and business cycle. 
For example, Shleifer and Vishny (2010) argued that additional capital liquidity would 
not lead to increase in bank lending and investment. Bleck and Liu (2014) showed a 
crowding-out effect in a situation of excess liquidity, as credit resource would be 
misallocated when central bank injected excessive liquidity into the economy. While 
Benmelech and Bergman (2012) discussed a credit trap equilibrium which argued for 
the ineffectiveness of an expansionary monetary policy in stimulating investment, Li 
(2013, 2014, 2017b) and Li and Hazari (2015) pointed further to the theoretical 
potentiality of the “low interest rate trap” that led to speculation rather than investment. 
In the discussion on business cycles, while Eisfeld and Rampini (2005) showed the 
benefits of resource allocation in business cycles, Hoffmann and Schnabl (2011) argued 
that credit expansion in a situation of distorted capital price might cause a slump, and 
subsequent oscillations in the financial sector would lead to rise in risky projects. Pan 
et al. (2016) used both provincial and firm data to show that China’s excess liquidity 
could be as high as 50%, and although it came without severe inflation, excess liquidity 
had resulted in credit misallocation and inefficiency between the state sector and private 
sector.       
Studies on the relationship between resource misallocation and TFP included 
discussions on technology-skill mismatch, inefficient operation of technology and trade 
barrier (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Parente and Prescott, 1999, 2000; Alcala and 
Ciccone, 2004). Restuccia and Regerson (2008) discussed the distortion in the cost of 
capital caused by imposition of tax on high productivity plants and provision of 
subsidies for low productivity plants. On economy-wide studies, Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009) benchmarked US firms to show that productivity loss in China and India 
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amounted to 50% and 60%, respectively. Similarly, Gopinath et al. (2015) showed that 
a decrease in interest rate would lead to misallocation in capital resources. By 
distinguishing between domestic credit frictions and capital inflows, Reis (2013) 
showed that unproductive firms increased at the expense of productive firms in the non-
tradable sector. Based on Asia’s 1997-1998 financial turmoil, Virgiliu and Xu (2014) 
used producer-level data from South Korea to show that capital misallocation led to a 
fall of 8% in TFP. 
China’s loose financial policy has remained unchanged for decades and despite the 
enlarging market economy and financial liberalization in the 1980s and the 1995 
banking reform that had opened new financial channels and institutions, state financial 
intervention remained crucial (Li and Liu, 2004; Li, 1999, 2009). Discussion using the 
excess liquidity framework could provide an additional and useful tool to analyze 
China’s loose financial performance. By employing the concept of abundance in 
liquidity and shallow finance (Polleit and Gerdesmeier, 2005; Ferrero et al., 2010; 
Brana et al., 2012), this paper argues that despite China’s rapid growth in the last few 
decades, China’s “cash-richness” had merely led to expansion in its money supply but 
not in its effectiveness. This empirical study shows that China’s credit misallocation 
hindered its total TFP growth, leading eventually to its decline. Economic centralization 
has meant that the state involved in all production activities. Typically, there are two 
sources of financial intervention. State banks and finance institutions would provide 
loans at ultra-low interest rate to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to maintain production 
and employment, while fiscal subsidies were provided to both enterprises to maintain a 
low price and households to subsidize their living expenses. Despite economic reform 
in 1978, the adoption of a market economy and reform of banks in the 1990s, bank 
loans and subsidies still served as important sources of funds to state enterprises and 
households, especially in such economic difficult time as in 2009 when the state 
deployed a four trillion-yuan stimulus package after the global financial meltdown of 
2008 to rescue the economy, resulting in the high M2 growth rate reaching 28% in 2009 
(Li, 1994, 2017a). 
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Given China’s decades-long practice of a loose financial policy through provision 
of loans and fiscal subsidies, it would be necessary to examine if such practices are 
producing positive economic results as the China economy is becoming more 
marketized, especially in the period after the 2008 world financial turmoil. China’s data 
on outstanding loans and state subsidies can be used to examine the possibility of excess 
liquidity and its impact on TFP. For simplicity, excess liquidity is empirically 
considered when the increase in liquidity resulted in an inverse relationship with TFP 
growth. Section II provides the discussion on China’s economic and financial data and 
the construction of variables for empirical analysis. Section III presents the 
methodology, while section IV elaborates on the empirical findings. The last section 
concludes the paper. 
 
II The China Data 
Data from the World Bank shown in Figure 1 for the period 1985-2015 concludes 
that China’s M2/GDP ratio has experienced drastic increases from 50% to over 200% 
between 1985 and 2015. China’s has a much higher M2/GDP ratio when compared to 
such developing countries as Brazil and India and such developed countries as the USA 
and other OECD countries. Indeed, China’s M2/GDP ratio is nearly twice as large as 
that of the world average.   
 
Source: World Bank Databank. 

























Sources: World Bank Databank, estimates by the authors. 
Fig. 2 China’s annual growth rates of M2, GDP and TFP: 1985 - 2014 
 
Similarly, China’s M2 growth rate has been higher than the growth rates of GDP 
and total factor productivity (TFP), as shown in Figure 2. Since 2009, the average M2 
growth rate has been higher than 17%. Both GDP and TFP growth rates shown in Figure 
2 had declined since 2009. Such a decline has already been observed in several studies. 
For example, Bai et al. (2016) demonstrated that liquidity injection has been used in 
the infrastructure sector though bank loan provisions. Brandt et al. (2013) showed that 
China’s loss in TFP was due to resource misallocation between state and non-state 
sectors, while Li (2018) showed that China’s manufacturing TFP declined since 2008. 
Other studies on China’s banking performance have shown similar conclusions (Li, 
2009; Chen et al., 2011; Chong et al., 2013).  
 In addition to the construction of such conventional variables as physical capital, 
human capital and labor, additional data on subsidies, outstanding loans and several 
control variables are collected. The various macro-data for the 29 provinces in China 
that covered the period from 1984 to 2015 are obtained from the various issues of the 
Statistical Yearbook of China, the Finance Yearbook of China, the WIND database, the 
China Compendium of Statistics and the Population Censuses of 1990, 2000 and 2010. 
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the data of Chongqing was incorporated into Sichuan province after 1997.  
 By using the perpetual inventory approach in constructing the provincial capital 
stock, we followed the steps in Chow and Li (2002), Li (2003, 2009) and Liu ad Li 
(2012) to construct, derive and update the provincial physical capital stock to 2015. To 
avoid double counting on both side of the equation, we separated the loan sector from 
the capital stock. The capital stock so constructed thus excluded bank loans. Similarly, 
in constructing the human capital stock, we followed the method and steps in Li (2009) 
and Li and Liu (2011) that depended on the six schooling levels in China (primary, 
junior secondary, senior secondary, specialized secondary, vocational secondary and 
higher education). With the new classification of education introduced since 2004, the 
six schooling levels were combined into four schooling levels (primary, junior 
secondary, senior secondary and higher education) to calculate the human capital stock 
using the average schooling year per capita. The construction of human capital is based 
on the number of graduate students aged 15-64 in each schooling levels in 1990 as a 
benchmark and adjusted by provincial migration and death rate. The human capital 
stock is derived by the total sum of schooling year for each province. Primary and 
Junior Secondary require 5 and 8 years of schooling, respectively. Senior Secondary 
includes Specialized Secondary and Vocational Secondary in the old classification with 
11 years, while Higher education with 14.5 years. The data on the number of workers 
is used as the labor proxy. 
 China’s provincial data on the final account of budgetary revenue and expenditure 
show the provision of government subsidy expenditures to loss-making SOEs and 
price-subsidies to households. Subsidies to loss-making SOEs refer mainly to the 
financial subsidies allocated to the SOEs for them to stay in production in accordance 
with the state plan, but losses were incurred because the low planned price was unable 
to offset the cost of production including the backward technology and equipment and 
poor marketing strategy. For example, to maintain price stability, planned price tended 
to stay low and SOEs could not compete with non-state enterprises. Bank loans are 
effectively subsidies given to maintain production in SOEs to avoid closure and rise in 
unemployment, especially in sensitive industries and regions. While subsidies are 
8 
 
sources of economic distortion, other argued that subsidies aided China’s export growth 
(Eckaus, 2006; Grima et al., 2009) 
The data on price subsidy to households formed the largest proportion of fiscal 
subsidies, especially subsidies given to agricultural produce. Price subsidies are part of 
the financial policy used to adjust the market price on daily necessities and agricultural 
produce. The price subsidy was intended to stabilize prices, regulate supply and demand, 
and balance the interests of producers and consumers. The sum of the Subsidies to Loss-
making Enterprises and Expenditure for Price Subsidies in the 29 provinces are used as 
the proxy for the subsidy variable. However, due to the adjustment on the budget and 
final accounts of local governments in 2007, the subsidies data could only be available 
for the period of 1991-2006. The subsidies variable is measured by the sum of subsidies 
to the enterprises and household adjusted by the GDP deflator to derive the real values. 
We use subsidies as another input and incorporated it with capital stock, human capital 
and labor unit to measure the TFP growth rate by using the Malmquist index in the 
empirical research.  
For the financial variable and since the provincial M2 data would not be available, 
the data on the outstanding loan to GDP would be used as a proxy to measure the 
liquidity (see, for example, Levine and Zervos, 1993; Caldern and Liu, 2003; Giuliano 
and Marta, 2009; Pan et al., 2016). We let the growth rate of outstanding loan over the 
growth rate of GDP as a measure of the liquidity ratio. In addition, we used several 
control variables that could affect or reflect China’s TFP growth. Firstly, data on 
provincial patents should give an indication on the relationship between innovation and 
TFP growth, as studies have shown that patent played a significant role in TFP growth 
(Schmooker, 1963; Griliches, 1990; Dosi et al., 1990; Porter and Stern, 2000). The 
patents data are obtained from the various years of the Patent Statistics Annual Report 
published by the State Intellectual Property Office. The provincial data on the hospital 
bed per capita and the student-teacher ratio are used as additional control variables to 
measure the extent of infrastructure development (Fernald, 1999; Duggal et al., 1999; 
Haughwout, 2003; Mitra et al., 2012). Finally, data on the birth rate shall show the 
relationship between population growth and TFP (Jones, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; 
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Afonso et al, 2013; Gollin and Richard, 2014). The statistical summary of variables is 
shown in Appendix Table 1.  
 
III Methodology 
 We begin by estimating China’s TFP growth rate using real GDP in each province 
as the output, while inputs include the constructed capital stock, human capital and 
labor units. The subsidy variable is then inserted as another input variable to show if 
subsidies affected TFP. In addition to the traditional Solow residual method in 
estimating the TFP (Solow, 1956), we employ the Malmquist index method to estimate 
China’s TFP. The Malmquist index is originally used to construct the consumption 
quantity index before it is applied to productivity and efficiency analysis (Sten, 1953; 
Caves et al., 1982; Charnes et al., 1978, 1994). The advantage of the Malmquist index 
is that it does not require a priori assumption on the structure of the production function 
and can decompose productivity changes to allow for the existence of inefficient 
behavior. Furthermore, the use of the first difference method in deriving China’s TFP 
growth using the Malmquist index would avoid possible data anomalies. 
The construction of the Malmquist productivity index is based on the definition of 
distance function and the linear programming method is used to estimate the boundary 
production function of the decision-making unit (DMU). The estimated Malmquist 
productivity index shows effectively the TFP growth rates. In addition, the change in 
efficiency and technology progress is also measured during the process. Consider there 
are k units of DMUs, and each DMU uses n kinds of inputs x in t period, and get m 
kinds of outputs Y. In time t, the possible production set that satisfies certain technical 
constraints is represented by S: 
(1)    𝑆𝑡 = (x, y).           
According to the definition of the distance function in Shephard (1970), the output 
distance function of the production possibility set S in time t relative to time t+1 is: 
(2)   𝐷𝑜𝑡(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) = inf {𝜃| (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡𝜃 ) ∈ 𝑆𝑡+1} = (sup{z|(𝑥𝑡, 𝑧𝑦𝑡) ∈ 𝑠𝑡+1})−1, 
where D is the distance function, the subscript "O" indicates that the distance function 
10 
 
is based on the definition of the output, while xt and yt indicate the input and output at 
period t, respectively. Accordingly, the distance function 𝐷𝑜𝑡  stands for the value of 
the distance function of DMU at period t in the production frontier at period t+1. At the 
same time, the distance function  𝐷𝑂𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) stands for the value of the distance 
function of DMU at period t+1 in the production frontier at period t. The distance 
function 𝐷𝑂𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) stands for the value of the distance function of DMU at 
period t+1 in the production frontier at period t+1. The Malmquist productivity index 
can be expressed as: 
(3)   𝑀𝑜𝑡 = 𝐷𝑜𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝐷𝑂𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)  .   
The Malmquist index measures the changes of TFP from period t to t+1 under the 
technical conditions in period t. Similarly, under the technical conditions of period t+1, 
the change of TFP from period t to t+1 can be expressed as: 
(4)   𝑀𝑜𝑡+1 = 𝐷𝑜𝑡(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝐷𝑂𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡) . 
The construction of the Malmquist productivity index based on period t and t+1 is 
symmetrical in economic meaning. To avoid the difference caused by arbitrariness in 
choosing period and according to Fisher’s (1922) idea of ideal index, we can define the 
geometric mean for the comprehensive productivity index. Next, we use two geometric 
means from the Malmquist productivity index to measure the change of productivity 
from period t to t+1, we thus have 
(5)   𝑀0(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) = (𝑀𝑂t ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑡+1)12 = [𝐷𝑂𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝐷𝑜𝑡(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝑂𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝐷𝑜𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡) ]1/2. 
If the index is greater than 1, it would indicate that the TFP has increased from period 
t to t+1 and we could thus calculate the TFP growth rate.  
According to Fare (1992) and Ray and Desli (1997), the technical efficiency change 
in TFP can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency change and scale efficiency 
change, shown as: 
(6)    𝑀0(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1; 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐶𝐻 = 𝐷𝑂𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝐷𝑜𝑡(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡) ∗ [ 𝐷𝑂𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝐷𝑜𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1) ∗
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𝐷𝑂𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)𝐷𝑜𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)]12 = 𝐷𝑂𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝑣𝐷𝑜𝑡(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)𝑣 ∗ [ 𝐷𝑜𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝑣𝐷𝑜𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)𝑣 ∗
𝐷𝑜𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝑣𝐷𝑜𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)𝑣
]12 ∗ [ 𝐷𝑂𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝑣𝐷𝑂𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)𝑣 ∗
𝐷𝑂𝑡 (𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)𝑣𝐷𝑂𝑡+1(𝑥𝑡,𝑦𝑡)𝑣]12. 
The efficiency change measures the relative technical efficiency movement under 
the conditions of constant return of scale from period t to t+1, capturing whether the 
production is catching up or getting farther away from the production possibility 
frontier. The value of this indicator could be greater than 1, less than 1 or equal to 1, 
respectively, indicating that technical efficiency has improved, reduced or remained 
unchanged. Technical change could be used to capture the possible movement of the 
production frontier while the production is assumed to be on the frontier. If the index 
is greater than 1, it should indicate that the technical set moved forward, while equal to 
1 indicates that technology does not change, and less than 1 indicates that the technical 
set moved backward.1 
 In the empirical framework, we began with the pooled OLS and fixed effect 
regression models to test the relationship between the TFP growth rate and liquidity. 
By using the additional control variables, we estimate the equation as follows:  
(7)      𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  denotes the lagged value of the TFP growth rate in province i, 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 represents the liquidity variable, which is indicated by the growth rate of 
the loan over the growth rate of the GDP at time t in province i. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 (benchmark) is 
the control variable, which includes the number of patent, hospital bed per capita, 
student-teacher ratio, and the birth rate. 𝜇𝑡 and 𝜂𝑖 are the province-specific fixed 
effect and time-fixed effect, respectively. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
The regression of pooled OLS and fixed effect might not address the possible 
endogeneity issue. Firstly, it is plausible that the productivity growth rate would have 
 
1 In the Malmquist index, the TFP change can be decomposed into technology change (TECHCH) and 
efficiency change (EFFCH), which could in turn be divided into pure efficiency change (PEFFCH) and 
scale change (SCH). We do not discuss the PEFFCH and SCH in the subsequent tables. 
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an impact on the growth rate of loans. For example, for some higher TFP province in 
China, such as Jiangsu and Shanghai, they would have more loan resources made 
available to stimulate economic or productivity growth, which in turn could likely affect 
the amount of the outstanding loan. Secondly, there may be some omitted variables in 
the regression model, such as the availability of province-specific resource, market 
segmentation and institutional factors, though province-specific fixed effect model 
could solve this problem. However, if the omitted variable is related to the independent 
variables, it would also lead to the endogeneity issue and the estimated coefficients 
would be biased.  
To solve the problems arising from endogeneity, we improve the regression 
exercise by using the system-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as discussed in 
Arellano and Bond (1991). The GMM regression includes the first-differenced GMM 
estimation and system GMM estimation. Taking the first difference of model shown in 
Equation (7), we have first-differenced GMM model indicated by Equation (8), 
(8)    , 1 , 1 2 , 3 , ,i t i t i t i t i tTFP TFP LOANgdp X   − =  +  +  +  
    By differentiating the model and setting the instruments as the lagged of the 
variables, the first-differenced GMM estimation eliminate the unobserved cross-section 
individual effect and overcome the potential endogeneity problem caused by 
heteroscedasticity. However, Blundell and Bond (2000) argue that the estimator from 
the first-differenced GMM estimator could still be bias and imprecise when the 
instruments are weakly correlated with subsequent first differences. To solve the weak 
instruments problem, we used the system GMM estimation model shown in Equation 
(9), which applied the lagged first-difference of the series as instrument variables for 
the equations in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995), shown as: 
(9)   
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , ,
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , , ,
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
TFP TFP LOANgdp X
TFP TFP LOANgdp X v




= + + +
 =  +  +  +
 
    Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) found that the system GMM estimation could 
overcome the small sample bias problem in the first-differenced GMM estimation 
caused by the weak instruments. The system GMM estimation used the instrument 
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variable which is constructed appropriately by the lagged first-differences to generate 
the additional moment conditions, which are combined with the standard moment 
conditions from the first-differenced GMM estimation. This method also releases the 
restrictions on the distribution of the random error term and allows the random error 
term to have heteroscedasticity and sequence correlation. Therefore, the estimator 
would be unbiased and more efficient than other estimators and we applied the system 
GMM estimator in the empirical findings.    
    Other research studies argued that it is not possible to determine the functional 
relationship between the TFP growth rate and liquidity with specific parameter 
constraints (Cooper and Ross, 1998; Cao et al., 2008, Bleck and Liu, 2014). Thus, the 
linear parametric model may run the risk of invalid parameter estimation. To ensure 
consistent estimates, we extend the empirical exercise by using the nonparametric 
regression model to study the relationship between the TFP growth rate and liquidity. 
The nonparametric method relaxes the restrictions on the assumptions of the 
distribution and the functional form. In addition, it allows the data to determine the 
adaptability and flexibility of the functional form (Henderson et al., 2008; Li et al., 
2016). Hence, we have: 
(10)      𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝑓 (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where 𝑓 (·, · ) is an unknown function. 
    Next, we estimate model (9) by using the nonparametric local polynomial linear 
estimation, as in Fan and Gilbels (1992) and Ullah and Roy (1998). Suppose 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
represents 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡  represents (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ), then we approximate the 
unknown regression function f (.，.) locally by a polynomial. For given x, we have the 
first-order Taylor expansion: 
(11)          𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝑓(𝑥) + ( )x (𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  


















 , x1  and x2 represent 
possible excess liquidity 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡  and other control variables 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 , respectively. 
Then this polynomial is fitted locally by a weighted least squares regression problem:  
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We solve this function and calculate the nonparametric local polynomial linear 
estimator, shown as: 
(13)  , ,1
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h h
 −
= = = =
− −
= − − − −  , 
where h is the bandwidth and k is the kernel function. According to model (9), we could 
have the estimator of the nonparametric regression, 
(14)       1( ) (1,0) ' ( ),x x = 2 ( ) (0,1) ' ( ),x x =  
where β1 and β2 represent the two partial derivatives of function,  𝑓  (·, ·) at 
1 2( , )x x x= . When compared to the traditional parametric regression, the advantage of 
the nonparametric local polynomial linear estimation is more efficient because it avoids 
the bias estimation caused by the misspecification error of the model. 
Lastly and as a control study, we reconstructed the work in Brandt et al. (2013) on 
the influence of excess liquidity on TFP loss. We followed the steps in Brandt et al. 
(2013) to measure the TFP loss according to resource misallocation between the state 
sector and non-state sector in each province： 
(15) 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1
, , , | | , | |[ ] / ( ) [( ) ( ) ]i i s i n i i i s s i s i i n n i n iTFP Y Y L K TFP L K TFP L K








−= +   
(17) *ln( / )i i iTFPloss TFP TFP= , 
where iTFP  and 
*
iTFP represent respectively the actual TFP and the efficient TFP in 
province i. ,i sY  and ,i nY  are, respectively, the real GDP of state sector and non-state 
sector in province i. iL  and iK  represent respectively the employment and capital 
stock in each province i. |s iL  , |n iL  , |s iK   and |n iK  are, respectively, the share of 
employment and capital stock at state sector and non-state sector in province i. ,i sTFP  
and ,i nTFP  represent, respectively, the TFP at state sector and non-state sector.  -1 is 
the elasticity of the substitution, and   is the output elasticity of labor. The efficient 
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TFP is then the aggregate TFP after reallocating the resource to each sector and province, 
and the TFP share equals to the share of employment and capital stock in each sector 
and province. We use the province level date to construct the capital stock in each sector 
and province and combine with the employment and real GDP to measure the TFP loss 
from 1991 to 2014. As in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Brandt et al. (2013), we set the 
output elasticity of labor α equals to 0.67 and the elasticity of the substitution  -1 to 
1.5.  
 
IV Empirical Results 
 We examine the relationship between TFP and liquidity as represented by the 
growth rate of loan to the growth rate of GDP ratio. The Malmquist index is used to 
calculate China’s TFP for the period 1984-2014 using the estimated physical capital 
stock, human capital stock and labor. Then, we use different time periods to test the 
relationship between the TFP growth rate and liquidity. Next, the performance of 
China’s provincial TFP is adjusted by using the subsidy figures for the period 1991-
2006. Thus, provincial TFP growth rates with and without subsidy are presented. Lastly, 
by following Brandt et al. (2013), we measure the TFP loss with resource misallocation 
for the period 1991-2014 and reexamine the relationship between TFP loss and excess 
liquidity. In alignment with the practice in China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the 29 
provinces are grouped into four regions: Central (Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi 
and Shanxi), East (Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang), Northeast (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning) and 
West (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, 
Xinjiang and Yunnan).  
Appendix Table 2 reports the four sets of findings on TFP change, efficiency change, 
technical change and TFP growth for the 29 provinces and the four regions in different 
time periods. For the period 1984-1991, China has shown a TFP growth rate of 1.41%. 
China’s TFP growth experienced a rapid increase in the two periods of 1991-1999 and 
1999-2007, especially in the Eastern region, and in such provinces as Guangdong, 
Jiangsu and Shandong, the TFP growth rates amounted to 9%. However, both the TFP 
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change and TFP growth rates depended more on technical change instead of efficiency 
change. The situation changed after the 2008 global financial meltdown as the TFP 
growth rate was much lower in the period 2007-2014. Even in the Eastern region, the 
average TFP growth rate fell by nearly 4%, while the TFP growth rates in the other two 
regions fell by 1% to 2%, except for the central region. Appendix Table 3 shows the 
national performance for the period 1985-2014. We find that the average national TFP 
growth rate was around 3.58%, which gives a similar finding when compared to other 
studies (e.g. Chow and Li, 2002; Wu, 2011; Li, 2003, 2016). Nevertheless, the TFP 
growth rate declined dramatically in 2009 and in the period of 2011-2014. The decline 
was due not only to efficiency change, but due also to technical change. 
In Appendix Table 4, we took into consideration subsidies to measure the provincial 
TFP change, efficiency change, technical change and TFP growth rate in the period 
1991-2006 and the estimates are compared with those TFP growth rates without 
subsidies. The use of subsidy has always been debated as a source of economic 
distortion. In Communist China, subsidy provisions have been used since 1949 and 
SOEs and households have taken such provision for granted. Even though the findings 
show that the average TFP growth rate have improved in most provinces, it is 
interesting to note that such richer and more market-oriented coastal provinces as 
Guangdong, Shanghai and Jiangsu performed better with subsidies. Similarly, there are 
a total of 5 provinces (Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Jilin) whose TFP 
growth rate declined with subsidies. Most of these provinces are non-coastal provinces 
that were less attractive to foreign investment. Among the four regions, it is only the 
central region which has performed slightly better in TFP growth without subsidies, 
while the TFP growth in all the three other regions performed weaker without subsidies. 
Since economic reform, it has been the remote provinces in central and western regions 
which have been the focus of subsidy provisions as they, unlike the coastal provinces, 
were unattractive to foreign investment. 
The estimates of the benchmark model in Table 1 show the relationship between 
control variables and TFP growth rates using pooled regression, fixed effect and 
system-GMM methods. We find that the control variables show different degrees of 
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significance with the TFP growth rate. The birth rate has a negative significant impact 
on TFP growth in all three regressions. Patent gives a negative relationship but is 
significant only in regression (2). The student-teacher ratio shows a positive significant 
impact on TFP growth in regression (1). The impact of hospital bed on TFP growth is 
negative but are significant in regressions (1) and (3). 
 
Table 1 The benchmark model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS(pooled) Fixed-Effect SYS-GMM 
VARIABLES tfpch tfpch tfpch 
    
Ltfpch 0.6103*** 0.4714*** 0.6055*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0369) (0.0933) 
birthrate -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0014*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
patent -0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ST-ratio 0.0005** -0.0001 0.0004 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
hospital bed -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0003** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Constant 0.0289*** 0.0330*** 0.0291*** 









Observations 841 841 841 
R-squared 0.508 0.555  
Number of province 29 29 29 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. tfpch is the TFP growth rate, Ltfpch is the lag 
change in the TFP growth rate, birthrate represents the birth rate, patent represents the 
number of patent in each province, ST-ratio and hospital bed are the student-teacher ratio 
and hospital bed per capita, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2 reports the regression estimates on the relationship between excess 
liquidity and TFP growth rate. The TFP estimation based on the Malmquist method is 
compared to the Solow method using OLS estimation. The TFP growth rates from 
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regression (1) to (3) are constructed by the Malmquist productivity index. Regressions 
(1) and (2) report the OLS estimate by using the pooled and fixed effect methods, 
respectively. The empirical results show a negative significant impact of excess 
liquidity using the loan to GDP ratio on the TFP growth rate. To deal with the 
endogenous problem, we use system GMM to test whether the excess liquidity would 
hinder real economic growth. Regression (3) shows that a 1% increase in excess 
liquidity leads to a decrease of 0.48% in TFP growth rate. 
 
 
Table 2 Liquidity and TFP growth rates 
VARIABLES TFP growth rate  
(Malmquist productivity index) 
 TFP growth rate  
(Solow residual method) 
 OLS 
(pooled) 
Fixed-Effect SYS-GMM  OLS 
(pooled) 
Fixed -Effect SYS-GMM 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Ltfpch 0.6005*** 0.4447*** 0.5691***  0.9675*** 0.9210*** 0.9546*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0359) (0.0897)  (0.0077) (0.0184) (0.0290) 
loangdp -0.0049*** -0.0061*** -0.0048***  -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
birthrate -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0015**  -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
patent -0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ST-ratio 0.0006** -0.0001 0.0005  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0011)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
hospital bed -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0002  -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0317*** 0.0290*** 0.0341  0.0048*** 0.0106*** 0.0064** 













Observations 841 841 841  841 841 841 
R-squared 0.525 0.581   0.954 0.957  
Number of 
province 
29 29 29  29 29 29 




The results in Table 2 confirmed our hypothesis about the inverse relationship 
between liquidity and TFP growth rate. The injection of excessive liquidity into the 
economy did hurt TFP growth instead of stimulating economic growth. The result 
shows not only that the excess liquidity has significant negative effect on TFP growth 
rate in regression (1) and (2), but also that the coefficient is significant negative in the 
system-GMM method. However, all the control variables in the GMM estimation do 
not show any significant impact. The TFP growth rate from regression (4) to (6) are 
constructed by the Solow method. We find that the results are consistent with those 
using the Malmquist productivity index. 
We further investigate the influence of liquidity on TFP growth rate in different time 
periods. Table 3 shows that the significant negative relationship between liquidity and 
TFP growth rate in the two periods from 1985 to 1998 and from 2010 to 2014 in 
regressions (1) and regression (3), respectively, while regression (2) presents the 
positive significant for the period from 2000 to 2008. From the data shown in Figure 2, 
the M2 growth rate was much lower in this period. However, after the 2008 world 
financial turmoil and the subsequent injection of the four-trillion rescue package in 
2009, the relationship between TFP growth and liquidity showed a reverse trend. The 
TFP growth rate from regression (4) to (6) are constructed by the Solow residual method. 
The evidence clearly shows the negative and significant relationship between liquidity 
and TFP growth rate in regression (4) and (6). The results are also in line with our 
previous arguments that excess liquidity would hinder real economic growth. We do 
not find the obvious relationship between liquidity and TFP growth rate in the period 
from 2000 to 2008. Nonetheless, the result does not support the view that real economic 
growth could be promoted by using greater supply of liquidity. 
When subsidies are incorporated in the measure of TFP growth rate, Table 4 shows 
a more severe negative relationship between liquidity and TFP growth. Although the 
result in regression (1) is not significant, the results in regressions (2) and regression (3) 
once again confirmed the inverse relationship between liquidity and TFP growth rate. 
It is worth to note that the coefficient estimates of loangdp in regression (3) in Table 4 
is -0.0098, which shows a larger negative than the coefficient estimates in Table 2 (-
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0.0048) when subsidies were not included in the TFP. In magnitude terms, Table 4 
shows that an 1% increase in liquidity would lead to a further decline of TFP growth 
by 0.98%. One can conclude that excess liquidity has a greater negative impact on TFP 
growth when subsidies were incorporated.  
 
 
Table 3 Liquidity and TFP growth rates: Different sample periods 
VARIABLES TFP growth rate  
(Malmquist productivity index) 
 TFP growth rate  
(Solow residual method) 


















 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Ltfpch 0.4262*** 0.7892*** 0.4116***  0.9009*** 0.9375*** 0.9381*** 
 (0.0663) (0.1178) (0.1094)  (0.0412) (0.0488) (0.0650) 
loangdp -0.0120*** 0.0017* -0.0068*  -0.0010*** -0.0000 -0.0006** 
 (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0034)  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
birthrate -0.0014* -0.0013** 0.0005  -0.0001 -0.0002** 0.0002 
 (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0011)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
patent 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ST-ratio 0.0002 0.0005 0.0022*  0.0002 -0.0001* 0.0001 
 (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0012)  (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
hospital bed -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004  0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001* 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0488 0.0169 -0.0038  0.0022 0.0083*** 0.0026 





























Observations 377 261 145  377 261 145 
Number of 
province 
29 29 29  29 29 29 









Table 4 Liquidity and TFP with subsidies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS(pooled) Fixed-Effect SYS-GMM 
VARIABLES tfpch_s tfpch_s tfpch_s 
    
Ltfpch_s 0.0310 -0.1602** 0.0391 
 (0.0455) (0.0790) (0.0402) 
loangdp -0.0123 -0.0192** -0.0098*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0076) (0.0015) 
birthrate -0.0007 0.0112*** -0.0011 
 (0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0010) 
patent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ST-ratio 0.0024 -0.0002 0.0026*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0005) 
hospital bed 0.0011 -0.0043 0.0005 
 (0.0008) (0.0046) (0.0006) 
Constant -0.0021 0.2114 0.0029 









Observations 400 400 400 
R-squared 0.020 0.211  
Number of province 29 29 29 





Table 5 Nonparametric Regression: Liquidity and TFP growth rates 
Notes: Same as Table 1.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of nonparametric regression model based on model (8). 
The first two columns show the relationship between the TFP growth rate and liquidity. 
The only difference between regression (1) and regression (2) is that we incorporated 
fixed effect in regression (2). We could find that the coefficient estimated of liquidity 
is consistent with our previous parametric models with fixed effects and system GMM. 
A situation of excess liquidity hindered real economic growth since the coefficient of 
loangdp is negative and significant. Regression (3) and regression (4) show the 
relationship between liquidity and TFP growth rate with subsidies. Again, the difference 
between regression (3) and regression (4) is that we incorporated the fixed effect in 
regression (4). The results in Table 5 are consistent with those in the parametric model. 
In addition, the non-parametric with-subsidy regression results in Table 5 (-4.81%) 
shows a larger negative than the non-parametric results without subsidies (-0.65%). 
This evidence clearly shows that excess liquidity has a larger negative impact on TFP 
growth rate when subsidies were incorporated in the measure of TFP growth. 
Lastly, as a control study, the regression results on the influence of excess liquidity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Npregress Npregress_FE Npregress Npregress_FE 
VARIABLES  Tfpch Tfpch Tfpch_s Tfpch_s 
      
loangdp  -0.0065*** -0.0078*** -0.0481*** -0.0270*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0177) (0.0086) 
hospital bed  -0.0002** -0.0003* 0.0009 -0.0002 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0008) 
birthrate  -0.0035*** -0.0041*** 0.0028 -0.0007 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0037) (0.0025) 
ST-ratio  0.0020*** 0.0017*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
patent  0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0031 0.0010 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0027) (0.0020) 
      
Observations  866 866 426 426 
R-squared  0.618 0.720 0.506 0.763 
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on TFP loss as discussed in Brandt et al. (2013) are shown in Table 6. Among the three 
regression models, the GMM regression results are significant and the positive estimate 
confirmed that excess liquidity has a positive and significant impact on TFP loss, and 
an increase of 1% in excess liquidity would result in 0.6% loss in TFP due to market 
distortion. The estimates in Table 6 further confirmed the discussion on the inverse 
relationship between excessive injection of liquidity and the TFP growth rate. 
 
 
Table 6 Liquidity and TFP loss 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS(pooled) Fixed-Effect SYS-GMM 
VARIABLES tfploss tfploss tfploss 
    
loangdp 0.0723 0.0147* 0.0060*** 
 (0.0500) (0.0077) (0.0009) 
hospital bed -0.0281*** -0.0044*** -0.0030* 
 (0.0057) (0.0012) (0.0017) 
birthrate -0.0558*** -0.0621*** -0.0031 
 (0.0137) (0.0033) (0.0022) 
patent 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ST-ratio 0.0640*** -0.0198*** 0.0005 
 (0.0146) (0.0024) (0.0012) 
Ltfploss   0.9758*** 
   (0.0348) 
Constant 1.3614*** 1.5889*** 0.1754 
 (0.4205) (0.0737) (0.1178) 




  -1.20 
1.20 
458.58 
    27.36 
Observations 696 696 667 
R-squared 0.179 0.982  
Number of province 29 29 29 
Notes: Same as Table 1. tfploss is the TFP loss between the state sector and non-state 







 In this paper, we investigated the growth rate of TFP in China from 1984 to 2014 
by using province level data and the relationship between liquidity and TFP. First, we 
find that China’s TFP growth rate experienced dramatic decrease after 2008 and when 
subsidies are taken into consideration in studying TFP growth rate in different provinces, 
the empirical results are mixed but tended to suggest that the provision of subsidies in 
several provinces, including those rich coastal provinces, has significant positive effect 
on the TFP growth rate. Several explanations could come forward. One could be that 
provision of subsidies has already been regarded as a norm across provinces. It could 
be likely that subsidy provisions supplemented household income bringing them up to 
the actual market situation. Similarly, subsidy to enterprises aided their low cost of 
production. In other words, wage and cost of production in China was low because 
government subsidies compromised the rest of households’ wage and enterprises’ cost 
of production. Fiscal subsidies could have distorted the market, leading foreign 
investors to think that cost of production in China was low.   
The empirical results confirmed a situation of excess liquidity as the estimates 
showed a negative effect of liquidity on TFP growth rate in both the full sample and 
sub-samples. We also applied the provincial level data from 1991 to 2014 to measure 
the aggregate effect of excess liquidity and estimate its influence on TFP loss. We 
conclude that the increase of liquidity would lead to the TFP losses because of the 
resource misallocation between the state sector and non-state sector. In summary, our 
paper provides an empirical study showing the effect of excess liquidity on credit 
misallocation and decline of the TFP in China. We believe that the excess liquidity 
would lead to resource misallocation, which would in turn hinder TFP growth in China. 
The empirical study in this paper may shed some light on the result of China’s 
prolonged loose financial policy. Despite its decades of rapid economic growth, studies 
have confirmed that TFP growth has been due more to technical change probably from 
inward investment than to indigenous efficiency change (Li, 2009; Li and Liu, 2011; 
Li et al., 2011). Despite its political intention in the control of the economy, this paper 
has shown that China’s established financial policy of low cost loan provision and fiscal 
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subsidies to enterprises and households would have backfired economically, as the 
excessive supply of financial fund simply led to increase in “cash-richness” rather than 
promoting productivity. This shall serve as a wakeup call in making an assessment to 
China’s financial policy.  
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Appendix Table 1 Statistical Summary 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
real GDP 899 1588.105 2263.74 21.749 16421.6 
human capital  896 5.72758 1.866406 2.19644 14.037 
capital stock 899 7820.751 11735.59 109.06 88999.9 
labor 899 2271.653 1619.521 169.8 6606.5 
       
TFPgrowth 870 0.022805 0.036641 -0.03875 0.10479 
loangdp 870 1.343972 0.97758 -2.79829 9.79428 
hospital bed 870 32.16405 10.67947 15.8147 62.1962 
birthrate 870 14.34199 4.825314 4.85 27.08 
ST-ratio 870 20.20766 4.427019 9.8 32.8535 




                     
Appendix Table 2  
TFP Change, Efficiency Change, Technical Change and TFP Growth for selected years by province             
Province   TFP change   Efficiency Change   Technical Change   TFP Growth 
    1984-1991 1991-1999 1999-2007 2007-2014 1984-1991 1991-1999 1999-2007 2007-2014 1984-1991 1991-1999 1999-2007 2007-2014 1984-1991 1991-1999 1999-2007 2007-2014 
Anhui  0.99 1.05 1.04 1.06  0.97 1.02 0.99 1.00  1.02 1.03 1.05 1.05  -1.17% 5.08% 3.60% 5.56% 
Beijing  1.02 1.06 1.05 1.00  1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.06 1.05 1.00  1.93% 5.93% 4.94% -0.24% 
Fujian  1.01 1.04 1.02 1.03  1.00 1.02 0.98 1.01  1.01 1.02 1.04 1.02  1.05% 4.36% 1.65% 2.80% 
Gansu  1.02 1.01 1.03 1.01  1.00 0.97 0.98 1.01  1.02 1.04 1.05 1.01  1.75% 1.07% 2.75% 1.42% 
Guangdong 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.01  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99  1.05 1.07 1.07 1.02  5.71% 6.92% 7.30% 0.95% 
Guangxi  1.02 1.03 1.00 0.99  1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98  1.02 1.04 1.01 1.01  2.35% 3.12% 0.06% -1.24% 
Guizhou  0.99 1.00 1.02 1.04  0.97 0.96 0.98 1.03  1.02 1.04 1.04 1.01  -0.57% 0.02% 1.57% 4.02% 
Hainan  0.99 1.06 1.05 1.04  0.98 0.99 1.01 1.02  1.01 1.07 1.04 1.01  -0.56% 5.66% 4.94% 3.53% 
Hebei  1.00 1.02 1.02 1.01  0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99  1.02 1.03 1.04 1.02  0.34% 2.29% 2.36% 1.46% 
Heilongjiang 0.98 1.02 1.04 1.03  0.98 0.98 0.98 1.01  1.01 1.03 1.06 1.02  -1.79% 1.82% 3.75% 2.77% 
Henan  1.01 1.03 1.04 1.02  1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98  1.02 1.03 1.05 1.04  1.33% 3.45% 3.54% 1.96% 
Hubei  1.00 1.03 1.04 1.07  0.98 0.99 0.99 1.02  1.01 1.03 1.05 1.04  -0.16% 2.61% 4.10% 6.54% 
Hunan  1.00 1.02 1.04 1.05  0.98 0.99 0.99 1.01  1.02 1.03 1.05 1.04  -0.41% 2.30% 3.53% 5.26% 
lnn Mongolia 0.99 1.01 1.08 1.04  0.98 0.97 1.01 1.01  1.01 1.04 1.07 1.03  -0.67% 0.53% 7.86% 3.91% 
Jiangsu  1.06 1.13 1.12 1.07  0.99 1.01 1.00 1.00  1.07 1.12 1.12 1.07  6.37% 12.83% 11.68% 6.50% 
Jiangxi  1.00 1.00 1.04 1.05  0.99 0.98 0.99 1.02  1.01 1.03 1.05 1.04  -0.04% 0.47% 4.48% 5.48% 
Jilin  0.98 1.02 1.02 1.00  0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99  1.01 1.04 1.04 1.01  -1.93% 1.85% 1.97% 0.00% 
Liaoning  1.05 1.05 1.06 1.04  1.04 1.00 1.00 1.01  1.01 1.05 1.05 1.02  5.17% 5.03% 5.62% 3.80% 
Ningxia  1.01 1.00 0.99 0.99  1.01 0.97 0.98 1.02  1.01 1.04 1.02 0.97  1.36% 0.16% -0.90% -0.77% 
Qinghai  1.00 1.02 0.99 0.99  1.00 0.99 0.98 1.02  1.00 1.04 1.02 0.97  0.09% 2.37% -0.64% -0.84% 
Shaanxi  1.02 1.04 1.05 1.05  1.01 1.00 0.99 1.03  1.01 1.04 1.06 1.02  2.17% 3.73% 4.53% 4.93% 
Shandong  1.07 1.11 1.08 1.04  1.03 1.00 0.99 1.00  1.04 1.11 1.09 1.04  6.72% 10.57% 8.26% 3.99% 
Shanghai  1.01 1.08 1.07 1.02  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.01 1.08 1.07 1.02  1.37% 7.59% 7.22% 1.58% 
Shanxi  0.97 1.04 1.07 1.03  0.96 0.99 1.01 1.00  1.00 1.05 1.06 1.03  -3.37% 4.44% 6.96% 2.77% 
Sichuan  1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03  3.11% 3.05% 3.11% 3.10% 
Tianjin  0.98 1.05 1.06 1.03  0.98 0.99 1.02 1.03  1.00 1.06 1.04 1.00  -2.08% 5.10% 6.25% 2.56% 
Xinjiang  1.01 0.98 1.04 1.02  1.01 0.94 0.98 1.01  1.01 1.04 1.06 1.01  1.46% -1.81% 3.82% 2.26% 
Yunnan  1.03 1.00 1.01 1.02  1.01 0.97 0.96 0.98  1.01 1.04 1.06 1.04  2.74% 0.37% 1.35% 1.80% 
Zhejiang  1.09 1.13 1.12 1.05  1.01 1.01 1.00 0.97  1.08 1.13 1.12 1.08  8.69% 13.38% 11.65% 4.52% 
Average  1.01 1.04 1.04 1.03  1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00  1.02 1.05 1.05 1.02  1.41% 3.94% 4.39% 2.77% 
By region                     
Central   0.99 1.03 1.04 1.05   0.98 0.99 0.99 1.01   1.01 1.04 1.05 1.04  -0.64% 3.06% 4.37% 4.60% 
East  1.03 1.07 1.07 1.03  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.03 1.07 1.07 1.03  2.96% 7.46% 6.63% 2.76% 
Northeast  1.00 1.03 1.04 1.02  1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00  1.01 1.04 1.05 1.02  0.48% 2.90% 3.78% 2.19% 
West   1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02   1.00 0.98 0.98 1.01   1.01 1.04 1.04 1.01  1.38% 1.26% 2.35% 1.86% 
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Appendix Table 3 
National TFP Change, Efficiency Change, Technical Change and TFP Growth 
Year TFP Change Efficiency Change Technical Change 
TFP 
Growth 
1985 1.05 1.01 1.05 5.38% 
1986 1.00 1.03 0.98 0.44% 
1987 1.03 1.00 1.03 3.25% 
1988 1.03 1.00 1.03 3.02% 
1989 0.97 0.99 0.98 -2.95% 
1990 0.98 0.97 1.01 -2.06% 
1991 1.03 0.97 1.06 2.80% 
1992 1.07 0.99 1.08 6.99% 
1993 1.06 0.98 1.09 6.19% 
1994 1.05 0.98 1.06 4.61% 
1995 1.03 0.99 1.04 3.12% 
1996 1.04 1.00 1.03 3.59% 
1997 1.03 1.00 1.03 2.91% 
1998 1.02 0.99 1.03 2.30% 
1999 1.02 0.99 1.03 1.81% 
2000 1.02 0.99 1.03 2.20% 
2001 1.03 0.99 1.04 3.04% 
2002 1.04 0.98 1.06 3.59% 
2003 1.05 1.00 1.05 4.83% 
2004 1.05 1.00 1.05 5.19% 
2005 1.05 0.99 1.07 5.14% 
2006 1.05 0.99 1.06 5.28% 
2007 1.06 0.99 1.06 5.87% 
2008 1.04 1.01 1.02 3.61% 
2009 1.03 0.99 1.04 3.40% 
2010 1.05 1.01 1.04 5.11% 
2011 1.04 1.02 1.02 3.72% 
2012 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.62% 
2013 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.50% 
2014 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.44% 
      










Appendix Table 4 
TFP Change, Efficiency Change, Technical Change and TFP Growth with subsidies and without subsidies in each province from 1991-2006 
     
     
Province   With Subsidies     Without Subsidies 
    TFP change Efficiency Change Technical Change TFP Growth   TFP change 
Efficiency 
Change Technical Change TFP Growth 
Anhui  1.05  1.00  1.03  4.96%   1.03  1.00  1.03  2.96% 
Beijing  1.03  1.00  1.03  3.02%   1.03  1.00  1.03  2.67% 
Fujian  1.16  1.00  1.02  16.25%   1.02  1.00  1.02  1.74% 
Gansu  1.03  0.99  1.02  2.71%   1.01  0.99  1.02  1.24% 
Guangdong 1.10  1.00  1.07  10.42%   1.07  1.00  1.07  6.64% 
Guangxi  1.07  1.01  1.01  7.25%   1.00  1.00  1.01  0.29% 
Guizhou  1.07  1.00  1.03  7.12%   1.01  0.97  1.03  0.66% 
Hainan  1.17  0.98  1.02  16.87%   1.01  0.99  1.02  1.12% 
Hebei  1.03  1.00  1.02  3.24%   1.01  1.00  1.02  1.17% 
Heilongjiang 1.04  1.01  1.02  3.78%   1.03  1.01  1.02  3.40% 
Henan  1.05  0.99  1.03  5.03%   1.02  1.00  1.03  2.29% 
Hubei  1.02  1.00  1.02  1.60%   1.02  1.00  1.02  1.77% 
Hunan  1.04  0.99  1.03  3.75%   1.02  0.99  1.03  1.78% 
lnn Mongolia 1.04  1.02  1.01  4.34%   1.01  1.00  1.01  0.98% 
Jiangsu  1.14  1.00  1.12  14.48%   1.12  1.00  1.12  12.27% 
Jiangxi  1.01  0.99  1.02  1.01%   1.01  0.99  1.02  1.21% 
Jilin  1.01  1.00  1.01  1.28%   1.01  1.00  1.01  1.32% 
Liaoning  1.12  1.02  1.03  12.04%   1.04  1.01  1.03  4.29% 
Ningxia  1.01  0.99  1.01  0.75%   1.00  0.99  1.01  0.19% 
Qinghai  1.02  1.01  1.02  2.35%   1.02  1.00  1.02  1.65% 
Shaanxi  1.04  1.01  1.02  3.82%   1.02  1.01  1.02  2.49% 
Shandong  1.11  0.99  1.10  11.22%   1.10  1.00  1.10  9.71% 
Shanghai  1.13  1.00  1.07  13.18%   1.07  1.00  1.07  7.13% 
Shanxi  1.09  0.99  1.02  9.42%   1.02  1.00  1.02  2.24% 
Sichuan  1.06  1.00  1.02  5.87%   1.02  1.00  1.02  2.26% 
Tianjin  1.15  1.01  1.04  14.57%   1.04  1.01  1.04  4.33% 
Xinjiang  1.05  0.98  1.01  4.63%   0.99  0.98  1.01  -0.73% 
Yunnan  1.01  0.98  1.03  0.93%   1.00  0.97  1.03  -0.12% 
Zhejiang  1.14  1.00  1.12  14.28%   1.13  1.01  1.12  12.69% 
Average  1.07  1.00  1.03  6.90%   1.03  1.00  1.03  0.03 
By region                  
Central   1.04   0.99   1.02   4.30%     1.02   1.00   1.02   2.04% 
East  1.12  1.00  1.06  11.75%   1.06  1.00  1.06  5.95% 
Northeast  1.06  1.01  1.02  5.70%   1.03  1.01  1.02  3.00% 
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